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Article 2

The Installment Land Contract-A National
Viewpoint?
Grant S. Nelson* and Dale A. Whitman**

The installment land contract is rarely used in some states,
but in many it is the predominant means of vendor financing of
land sales. Much has been written about it, but nearly all of the
literature focuses on the law of one particular state or another.
Our purpose here is to provide a nationwide perspective, with
particular attention to the states in which the contract has been
widely used and extensively litigated. We propose to examine the
reasons for the installment contract's popularity, its advantages
and disadvantages, and the risks it presents to both vendor and
purchaser.
The installment land contract is the most commonly used
substitute for the mortgage or deed of trust. This device is also
sometimes referred to as a "contract for deed" or a "long-term
land contract." The installment land contract and the purchase
money mortgage fulfill an identical economic function-the financing by the seller of the unpaid portion of the real estate
purchase price. Under an installment land contract, the vendee
normally takes possession and makes monthly installment payments of principal and interest until the principal balance is paid
off. The vendor retains legal title until the final payment is made,
at which time full title is conveyed to the vendee. Such contracts
may be amortized over time periods as short as a year or two or
as long as twenty years or more. During the contract period, the
vendee normally will be required to pay the taxes, maintain casualty insurance, and keep the premises in good repair.
It is important to distinguish the installment land contract
from the ordinary executory contract for the sale of land, variously known a "binder," a "marketing contract," or an ''earnest
money" contract. This latter type of contract is used primarily to
establish the parties' rights and liabilities during the period between the date of the bargain and the date of closing, usually only
t
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a month or two later, on which title passes to the purchaser and
security agreements, if any, are consummated. In contrast, the
installment land contract governs the parties throughout the life
of the debt, while the earnest money contract is completed a t
closing when the purchaser either tenders the full purchase price
of the land or enters into a separate security agreement. Indeed,
it is not uncommon for parties to agree to enter into an installment land contract at the closing date of the earnest money contract.
When a vendee defaults under an installment land contract
the vendor has several traditional remedies. He may sue "(1)for
the installments which are due with interest thereon; (2) for specific performance of the contract; (3) for damages for the breach;
(4) to foreclose his vendee's rights; (5) to quiet title; or if he
should desire, he may merely rescind the contract? These remedies, however, often involve litigation that may be too slow or
expensive to be practical, and some of them depend on the
vendee's capacity to satisfy a money judgment. Consequently,
only the quiet title action is used with any great frequency. Its
assertion is usually an outgrowth of the vendor's claim to his
purported rights under a forfeiture clause. This clause, found in
virtually every installment contract, typically provides that
"time is of the essence" and that when a vendee fails to comply
with the contract, including the obligation to pay promptly, the
vendor has the option to declare the contract terminated, to retake possession of the premises without legal process, and to retain all prior payments as liquidated damages. Generally, the
clause also relieves the vendor from all further obligation under
the contract.
As one commentator has aptly pointed out, "[ilf the contract is enforceable as written and if title will not be clouded . . .
[the installment land] contract gives the vendor a very favorable
remedy, much more advantageous than would be available under
a purchase money mortgage or deed of t r ~ s t . "Indeed,
under a
~
mortgage or deed of trust, the defaulting mortgagor has a right
to redeem (the equity of redemption) which the mortgagee can
eliminate only by a foreclosure proceeding should the mortgagor
prove to be uncooperative. The forfeiture clause in an installment
1. Comment, Installment Contracts for the Sale of Land in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. REV.
240, 243 (1959).
2. Id. at 244. See also Comment, Forfeiture: The Anomaly of the Land Sale Contract,
41 ALBANYL. REV. 71, 73-74 (1977).
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contract appears to give the vendor a remedy similar to foreclosure without any need for judicial action. For our purposes, however, it is important to emphasize that if the vendee resists forfeiture the installment land contract is advantageous only if it "is
enforceable as written and if title will not be clouded."
Installment land contracts have traditionally been used a s
mortgage substitutes in those states where the substantive law of
mortgages and the foreclosure remedies are considered to be
heavily pro-mortgagor. For example, in a substantial number of
states, judicial foreclosure is the only method of foreclosing a
mortgage. This procedure requires a full court proceeding in
which all interested persons must be made parties, and is often
time-consuming and costly. Against a mortgagor who contests the
mortgagee's claims, it may take several years to conclude such a n
action. Thus, utilization of the installment land contract in such
states, whatever its risks, is perhaps understandable. But the
risks are high, as will be seen below.

A. Some General Considerations
Traditionally, installment land contract forfeiture provisions
.~
of
were routinely enforced in favor of the ~ e n d o r Enforcement
such provisions presumably was based on a desire to carry out the
intent of the parties, even though forfeiture often resulted in a
substantial loss to the vendee and in a windfall gain to the venbecame especially burdensome on the vendee
d ~ rEnforcement
. ~
as the contract neared completion and the vendee's cash investment became increasingly substantial. Courts tended to ignore
the mortgage substitute aspect of the installment land contract
and to treat it instead as an executory contract for the sale of
land.
Today, however, the foregoing description of forfeiture clause
enforcement a t best serves as a point of departure. As has been
observed, the law in this area is not susceptible to orderly analysis: "Not only does the law vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
but within any one state results may vary depending upon the
type of action brought, the exact terms of the land contract, and
3. See Note, Forfeiture and the Iowa Installment Land Contract, 46 IOWA L. REV.786,
788 (1961); Note, Florida Installment Land Contracts: A Time for Reform, 28 U . FLA.
L. REV. 156, 159 (1975).
4. Note, Forfeiture and the Iowa Installment Land Contract, 46 IOWA L. REV.786,788
(1961).
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the facts of the particular case."5 The interplay of these various
factors makes it extremely difficult to predict whether the buyer's
interest will be forfeited. While forfeitures are still occasionally
it nevertheless can be safely stated that in no
judicially enfor~ed,~
jurisdiction today will a vendor be able to assume that forfeiture
provisions will be automatically enforced as written. This change
is the result of both legislative and judicial intervention to ameliorate the harsh impact of automatic forfeiture.

B. Statutory Limitations
Several states have attempted to alleviate some of the harshness in forfeiture clauses by enacting legislation regulating the
circumstances under which forfeiture is permitted. These statutes often incorporate a "grace period" within which late payments must be accepted. Perhaps the best example of this type
of legislation is the Iowa statute.' It provides that installment
land contracts may be cancelled only by following a specified
procedure. The vendor must provide written notification to the
defaulting vendee and to the person in possession of the real
estate; the notice must identify the real estate, specify the terms
of the contract that have not been complied with, and inform the
vendee that he has thirty days in which to correct his default. If
the vendee performs within this time period, the forfeiture is
avoided. If he does not, the notice of forfeiture, together with
proof of service, may be recorded to constitute constructive notice
of the completed forfeiture. Several other states have statutes
similar to that of 10wa;~the grace period varies from thirty days
in Iowa to as long as one year in North Dakota. In Minnesota, the
grace period extends up to sixty days depending on the percentage of the contract price the vendee has already paid.) Some of
these statutes permit nonjudicial forfeiture, while others allow it
only by judicial action. It should be emphasized, however, that
the purpose of these statutes is not to prevent forfeitures, but to
alleviate the harshness of their operation.1° In this connection
several observations should be made.
5. Power, Land Contracts as Security Devices, 12 WAYNE
L. REV.391, 416 (1966)
(footnotes omitted).
6. See, e.g., Ellis v. Butterfield, No. 12,086 (Idaho July 13, 1977), petition for rehearing filed, (Aug. 3, 1977).
7. IOWA
CODEANN.!i!i 656.1-.6 (West 1950).
8. See, e-g., MINN.STAT.ANN. 4 559.21 (West Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT.CODE§§ 32LAWSANN. $5 21-50-01 to 07 (1967).
18-01 to 06 (1976); S.D. COMPILED
9. MINN.STAT.ANN.!i 559.21 (West Supp. 1977).
L. REV.
10. See Note, Forfeiture and the Iowa Installment Land Contract, 46 IOWA
786, 797 (1961).

THE INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT

First, the statutory grace period approach, as a practical
matter, is analogous to the mortgage law concept of strict foreclosure. This mortgage foreclosure method, rarely used in the United
States, allows a judicial grace period during which the mortgagor
either pays the mortgage debt or forfeits the land to the mortgagee." Similarly, if a vendee under an installment contract fails to
correct a default within the statutory grace period, he loses the
land. It is perhaps ironic that in some respects the statutory
contract forfeiture procedures are more "pro-vendee" than the
strict foreclosure concept is "pro-mortgagor." Under strict foreclosure, the mortgagor must pay the accelerated debt or lose the
land. On the other hand, in such states as Iowa and Minnesota,
the defaulting vendee need only pay the arrearages within the
grace period, rather than the accelerated debt, in order to reinstate the contract.12
Second, to some degree these statutes have institutionalized
or formalized the forfeiture concept and, in so doing, may have
tended to discourage judicial interference in those situations
where the vendor complies with the statutory forfeiture method.13
For example, the Iowa and Minnesota cases allowing forfeiture
have been concerned for the most part with technical compliance
with the statutory procedure and have tended to downplay any
independent analysis of the fairness of the forfeiture.14
Finally, one practical advantage of statutory regulation is
that it encourages the stability of land titles. Whatever the defects in such statutory regulation, title examiners in many of
these states apparently routinely approve of the titles derived
through the statutory proceedings.15 There are a t least two reasons for this. First, the tendency of the courts to discourage attacks on forfeitures on nonstatutory grounds encourages reliance
on a forfeiture proceeding that complies with the applicable statute. Second, many of these statutes provide for the recording of
a written and formalized memorial of compliance with the stat11. See G . NELSON& D. WHITMAN,
CASESAND MATERIALS
ON REALESTATE
FINANCE
AND
DEVELOPMENT
229 (1976).
12. See Hampton Farmers Coop Co. v. Fehd, 257 Iowa 555, 559, 133 N.W.2d 872,874
(1965); Needles v. Keys, 149 Minn. 477, 480, 184 N.W. 33, 34 (1921); 51 IOWA
L. REV.488
(1966).
13. Note, Forfeiture and the Iowa Installment Land Contract, 46 IOWA
L. REV.786,
797 (1961).
14. See, e.g., id. at 792; Dale v. Pushor, 246 Minn. 254, 75 N.W.2d 595 (1956).
15. Nelson, The Use of Installment Land Contracts in Missouri-Courting Clouds on
Titles, 33 J . Mo. B. 161, 164 (1977).
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ute.16As a result, the title examiner is able to rely on the record
for evidence of a permissible forfeiture. This is true even where
the original contract is recorded. On the other hand, in states that
lack statutory control of the forfeiture process, the recording of a
statement that forfeiture has occurred may be regarded by a subsequent title examiner simply as a self-serving assertion that in
itself may constitute a cloud on title.
The Maryland statute takes a substantially different approach from those described above." Where an installment land
contract for the sale of residential property to a noncorporate
vendee is involved, forfeiture is prohibited. The vendor can utilize
the land to satisfy the vendee's debt only through a foreclosure
sale identical to that used for a mortgage? The vendee is entitled
to receive any surplus from the sale-that amount by which the
sale price exceeds the unpaid balance of the purchase price. Since
installment land contracts are treated like mortgages in residential transactions, there is apparently no incentive to continue
their use in the residential setting. On the other hand, the common law rules as to forfeiture presumably still apply to nonresidential installment land contracts.l8
Recent Oklahoma legislation constitutes perhaps the most
sweeping and decisive statutory regulation of installment land
contracts. In one relatively short paragraph, an Oklahoma statute
states that installment land contracts
16. The Iowa statute exemplifies such a provision:
If the terms and conditions as to which there is default are not performed
within said thirty days, the party serving said notice or causing the same to be
served, may file for record in the office of the county recorder a copy of the notice
aforesaid with proofs of service attached or indorsed thereon (and, in case of
service by publication, his personal affidavit that personal service could not be
made within this state) and when so filed and recorded, the said record shall
be constructive notice to all parties of the due forfeiture and cancellation of said
contract.
IOWA
CODEANN.1) 656.5 (West 1950).
17. MD. REALPROP.CODEANN. 1)g 10-101 to 108 (1974); MD. R. P. W79.
18. MD. R. P. W70 to W72, W77.
19. Ohio legislation governing termination of installment land contracts is also somewhat unique. It combines the "grace period" function with the additional requirement
that after either five years or payment of twenty percent of the purchase price, judicial
foreclosure is required. Thus, forfeiture is permitted and regulated during the early part
of the contract, whereas mortgage law takes over thereafter. See OHIOREV. CODEANN.§§
5313.01-.10 (1970). See also MONT.REV. CODES
ANN. $4 52-401 to 417 (Cum. Supp. 1975),
in which the Montana Small Tract Financing Act of 1963 made possible an optional power
of sale deed of trust mechanism for tracts of 15 acres or less. One commentator has
suggested that this legislation makes the installment land contract in Montana unnecessary. See Note, Toward Abolishing Installment Land Sale Contracts, 36 Mom. L. REV.
110 (1975).
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for purchase and sale of real property made for the purpose or
with the intention of receiving the payment of money and made
for the purpose of establishing an immediate and continuing
right of possession of the described real property, whether such
instruments be from the debtor to the creditor or from the
debtor to some third person in trust for the creditor, shall to that
extent be deemed and held mortgages, and shall be subject to
the same rules of foreclosure and to the same regulations, restraints and forms as are prescribed in relation to mortgages.20

The effect of this statutory provision is to treat all installment
land contracts entailing a transfer of possession to the vendee as
mortgages and thus to make the forfeiture remedy unavailable to
a vendor. Thus, installment land contracts presumably have been
rendered obsolete in Oklahoma. This legislation is especially significant in view of the fact that Oklahoma permits only judicial,
and not power of sale, foreclosure of m~rtages.~'

C. Judicial Limitations
Absent statutory regulation, numerous state courts have in
recent years refused to enforce against a defaulting vendee forfeiture clauses that the courts have deemed unreasonable or inequitable. These courts have employed several approaches to
save the vendee from forfeiture. Some cases, for example, have
in effect conferred on the vendee a mortgagor's equity of redemption, permitting him to tender the remainder of the purchase
price (or even his arrearages) in a suit or counterclaim for specific
performance of the contract. Where the vendee was unable or
unwilling to redeem, courts have occasionally ordered the judicial
foreclosure of the land contract. Finally, some courts, after determining that a particular forfeiture clause is unfair, have extended
to the defaulting vendee the right to restitution-the right to
recoup his payments to the extent that they exceed the vendor's
damages caused by the vendee's default. Of course, many state
courts have not considered the forefeiture clause in all of the
remedial contexts described above, nor have they always been
theoretically precise. Some courts have utilized contract principles to protect the defaulting vendee from an inequitable forfeiture provision. Other courts have gone a long way toward simply treating the installment land contract as a mortgage-in
much the same fashion as does the Oklahoma statute. Still others
20. OKLA.
STAT.ANN. tit. 16, 1) 11A (West Supp. 1976).
OKLA.
STAT.ANN. tit. 12, 1) 686 (West 1960).

21.
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have employed a confusing amalgam of mortgage and contract
law. The following sections examine these various approaches
employed by state courts to mitigate the harshness of forfeiture.
1.

Waiver by the vendor as an excuse for delinquency

Frequently a vendor will accept one or several late payments
from his purchaser without taking action to declare a forfeiture.
When the vendor finally reaches the end of his patience and informs the purchaser that forfeiture has occurred, the purchaser
may argue that the vendor's prior behavior constitutes a waiver
of the time provisions of the contract and that the vendor is
legally bound to accept the late payments. Often this dispute is
presented to the court in the context of a purchaser's suit or
counterclaim for specific performance of the contract. The vendee
may be willing to tender the entire purchase price, or he may
insist upon an opportunity to make up his arrearages and resume
the original payment schedule.
Many cases have adopted the purchaser's position in this
s i t u a t i ~ n In
. ~ ~effect, these cases hold that the vendor's waiver
avoids the effect of the forfeiture clause and creates in the purchaser a right analogous to an equity of redemption. According
to this view, if the vendor had given the purchaser clear notice
that no further delinquencies would be tolerated, and if this notice had been given in adequate time to allow the purchaser to
get back on schedule, the vendor might thereby have preserved
his right of forfeiture as to future installments. Since he did not
do so, the court itself will generally fix a reasonable time within
which the purchaser must cure the delinquencies.
The courts of Missouri and Utah have been particularly inclined to employ this technique. One commentator aptly described the Missouri situation:
Thus, Missouri courts today seem hesitant to give full effect
to forfeiture provisions as measures of liquidated damages in
installment land contracts. They are likely to find that such
provisions have been waived by the vendor due to such acts as
22. See In re Northern Ill. Dev. Corp., 309 F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1962),cert. denied, 372
U . S . 965 (1963); Triplett v. Davis, 238 Ark. 870, 385 S.W.2d 33 (1964); Petersen v. Ridenour, 135 Cal. App. 2d 720, 287 P.2d 848 (1955); Krentz v. Johnson, 36 Ill. App. 3d 142,
343 N.E.2d 165 (1976); Miles Homes, Inc. v. Mintjal, 17 Ill. App. 3d 642, 307 N.E.2d 724
(1974); Pierce v. Yochum, 330 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. App. 1975); Soltis v. Liles, 275 Or. 537,
551 P.2d 1297 (1976); Stinemeyer v. Wesco Farms, Inc., 260 Or. 109, 487 P.2d 65 (1971);
Bradley v. Apel, 531 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d
1145 (Utah 1976); Paul v. Kitt, 544 P.2d 886 (Utah 1975).
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his acceptance of late payments of principal or of interest on late
pay men ts after the delinquency of those payments. Furthermore, waiver of forfeiture provisions is equally likely to be found
in any of the following in which a land installment contract is
involved: viz., an action for ejectment by a vendor, an action for
specific performance by a defaulting vendee, a counterclaim for
specific performance by a defaulting vendee who is defendant to
an action for ejectment, or even a trespass action by a defaulting
vendee against his vendor concerning the land that is the subject of the contract. The finding that such a forfeiture provision
has been waived would be very likely if the value of the land
subject to the forfeiture provisions substantially exceeded the
amount still unpaid under the contract .23

The waiver cases tend to be variable and difficult to reconcile. In some cases rather innocuous forbearances by vendors have
been translated into favorable holdings for purchaser^,^^ while in
others quite substantial leniency has been ~ n a v a i l i n g In
. ~ ~one
Utah
for example, the vendees under an installment land
contract for the purchase of a house made sporadic late payments
for the first two years of the contract. Some monthly payments
were missed entirely. The vendor repeatedly demanded that the
contract be paid up to date, but from time to time the vendees
were assured that no forfeiture was contemplated "at that time."
Finally, more than two years from the date of the contract, the
vendor declared a forfeiture and after unsuccessful negotiation
brought an unlawful detainer action to have vendees ousted and
the contract forfeited. The trial court concluded that the vendor
had waived the strict performance of the contract. The Utah
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and upheld the forfeiture
in the following language: "Under the circumstances of this case,
we believe that the buyers . . . were given a reasonable length of
time to clear themselves of default. . . . They had not paid the
equivalent of the rental value of the property for the time they
occupied it. "27
The quoted language is quite telling. Obviously the amount
of the payments in relation to the rental value has nothing a t all
to do with whether there was an effective waiver by the vendor.
It is difficult not to conclude that the court was manipulating the
23. 29 Mo. L. REV.222, 226 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
24. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
25. See, e.g., Economy Sav. & Loan Co. v. Hollington, 105 Ohio App. 243,152 N.E.2d
125 (1957); Christy v. Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P.2d 401 (1942).
26. Pacific Dev. Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748 (1948).
27. Id. at 409, 195 P.2d at 751.
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waiver concept as a means of deciding whether, in terms of fairness and economic equity, the purchaser should have another
opportunity to make up his missed payments.28Such decisionmaking may be entirely salutory, but it should not be disguised.
2.

Recognition of an equity of redemption

A number of jurisdictions have taken the view that the purchaser, notwithstanding his default, should be granted a final
opportunity to make up the missed payments before losing his
land. Some courts view this right, analogous to a mortgagor's
equity of redemption, as unconditional, while others are inclined
to recognize it only if the purchaser's prior payments add up to a
substantial investment or "equity" in the property. Sometimes
the existence of the right is made to turn on whether the purchaser's payments significantly exceed the property's rental value
or some similar test. The critical point is that, unlike the cases
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, these opinions do not rely
upon a prior waiver by the vendor.
'
by the Missouri
A typical case is Nigh u. H i ~ k m a n , ~decided
Court of Appeals. There a vendee under an installment land contract covering farmland had paid almost 35% of the total purchase price. The vendee then defaulted on one payment by fifteen
days, and the vendor refused to accept the late payment. The
vendee sued for specific performance and tendered the balance
owing on the contract. The appellate court held that the trial
court correctly granted specific performance and that enforcement of the forfeiture clause would have been inequitable. Although the contract contained no "time of the essence" clause,
the court indicated that the result would not have been different
had such a clause been present.
The relationship between the granting of specific performance to a purchaser and more traditional mortgage concepts is
illustrated by the Florida Court of Appeals' opinion in H & L
Land Co. v. Warner.30There the vendee had made installment
payments for about five years, but thereafter a four-year period
elapsed during which no payments were made. During this period
of nonpayment the vendor remained silent as to the vendee's
--

28. The court may have been confusing the waiver concept with the principle of
equitable relief from forfeiture. See text accompanying notes 29-43 infra.
29. 538 S.W.2d 936 (Mo. App. 1976). See also Key v. Gregory, 553 S.W.2d 329 (Mo.
App. 1977).
30. 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. App. 1972). See also Huguley v. Hall, 157 So. 2d 417 (Fla.
1963); Mid-State Inv. Corp. v. O'Steen, 133 So. 2d 455 (Fla. App. 1961).
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default. The vendee ultimately sued for specific performance,
tendering the balance of the purchase price; the vendor counterclaimed for removal of the contract as a cloud on the vendor's
title. The court granted specific performance and stated: "[TJhe
vendor under a specifically enforceable installment land sale contract, who has received part of the purchase price and has given
the vendee possession of the land and the benefits and burdens
of ownership, is in essentially the same position as a vendor who
has conveyed the legal title and taken back a purchase money
mortgage . . . ."31The court implicitly imposed a t least three
conditions to be satisfied in order to qualify for specific performance: (1) The vendee must be in possession or have a right to
possession; (2) the contract must be specifically enforceable; and
(3) the vendee must assert and exercise his right of redemption
by tendering full performance .32
There are problems with these conditions, especially with the
last two. Arguably, tying these latter two requirements together
is an inconsistent blending of contract and mortgage law. It is
axiomatic that a vendee in default does not have a right to specific performance of a contract. Yet under mortgage law the right
to redeem is not exercised until there has been a default. In
Warner, the second requirement was met because the court found
that the vendor had waived the vendee's default. However, as has
been pointed out:
By so holding, the court is going in circles. If one must tender
the unpaid balance as a condition precedent to the vesting of the
right of redemption, then one must exercise this right before one
is entitled to it-an anomaly, to be sure. Thus, the rights of
mortgagors will not be extended to purchasers in default who are
either in straitened circumstances or unaware of the right of
redemption-the very individuals whom the mortgage statutes
were designed to protect.33

Notwithstanding this apparent anomaly, a more recent case reinforces the argument that, in general, Florida installment land
contracts will be treated as mortgages for redemption purposes.
In Hoffman v. Semet,34a Florida District Court of Appeals held
that a vendee in default under an installment land contract had
an equity of redemption and that the vendee's successor was enti31. 258 So. 2d at 295.
32. See Note, Florida Installment Land Contracts: A Time for Reform, 28 U .
FLA.L. REV. 156, 168-70 (1975).
33. Id. at 170.
34. 316 So. 2d 649 (Fla. App. 1975).
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tled to satisfy the total outstanding indebtedness due the vendor
under the contract and to receive a conveyance of the real estate.
The court cited Warner for the proposition that an installment
land contract "must be deemed and held to be a mortgage, subject to the same rules of foreclosure and to the same regulations,
restraints, and forms as are prescribed in relation to mortgage^."^^
Unlike the situation in Warner, however, there had been no
waiver of the default; therefore, the contract was not specifically
enforceable within the implicit requirements of Warner. The
Semet court did not deal with this difficulty. Instead, it simply
repeated "equity of redemption" language in referring to the
vendee's interest.
~~
how a
The Kansas case of Nelson v. R o b i n ~ o nillustrates
court can sometimes refuse to enforce a forfeiture provision and
in addition can impose a remedy that treats the installment land
contract involved as an equitable mortgage. The vendors in
Nelson brought an action to cancel an installment land contract
for the sale of farmland. The vendee was over $1900 delinquent
in back payments, but had paid nearly one third of the $48,000
purchase price and had made valuable improvements to the land.
The trial court refused to permit forfeiture, but rather ordered
strict foreclosure of the contract. Under the terms of the decree,
the vendee was given six months in which to pay the entire
amount remaining due on the contract. Failure to so pay within
that period would result in forfeiture of the land and back payments to the vendor. If the vendee paid only the arrearages within
ten days of the decree, however, the redemption period would
have extended to eighteen months. Interestingly, the vendee, and
not the vendor, appealed, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed this exercise of equitable discretion of the trial court. It is
noteworthy that the court here imposed the relatively rare mortgage remedy of strict foreclosure which was sought by neither
party, but in which the vendor acquie~ced.~'
The Nelson decision clearly does not mean that all installment land contracts in Kansas will henceforth be treated as mortgages. If, for example, the vendee's stake in the property had been
substantially less, perhaps immediate forfeiture would have been
orderedY The case, however, does illustrate that Kansas vendors
35. Id. at 651.
36. 184 Kan. 340, 336 P.2d 415 (1959).
37. This mortgage remedy is apparently the standard method in Wisconsin for terminating a vendee. See Exchange Corp. v. Kuntz, 56 Wis. 2d 555, 202 N.W.2d 393 (1972).
38. For a discussion of the significance of the proportion paid, see Croft v. Jensen,
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cannot rely on automatic enforcement of the forfeiture clause.
Thus, in Kansas, courts may very well apply the law of mortgages
to some installment contracts and contract law to others.
In California, the movement toward recognition of a right of
redemption for a defaulting vendee has received a considerable
impetus from general statutory provisions, although their application was somewhat uncertain until fairly recently.39In Barhis
v. Scott," the California Supreme Court reevaluated a long line
of earlier precedents dealing with forfeiture. The court concluded
that when a forfeiture would otherwise result, the vendee can be
relieved therefrom under section 3275 of the Civil Code which
provides that
Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs
a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forefeiture, by reason of
his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved
therefrom, upon making full compensation to the other party,
except in case of a grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent
breach of duty.*'

The vendor in Barkis sought to quiet title and to enforce a forfeiture after the vendees inadvertently overdrew their bank account
with their monthly house payment. The vendees' later efforts a t
payment were refused by the vendor. The supreme court held
that section 3275 should provide relief from forfeiture and that
the vendees had established the right to keep the contract in
force. Here the default was, at most, negligent and not "grossly
negligent, willful, or fraudulent."
In MacFadden u. Walker,42the California Supreme Court
dealt with the "willful, but repentant defaulting vendee." There
an elderly lady vendee had been in willful default over two years,
but had paid over half of the purchase price. When the vendor
sought to quiet title to the property, she counterclaimed for specific performance, tendering the full amount due and owing on
the contract. The court held that the policy against forfeitures
includes granting the right to specific performance even when the
default is willful, reasoning that, when taken together, the prohibition against punitive damages contained in section 3294 of the
Civil Code, the strict limitations on the right to provide for liqui86 Utah 13, 40 P.2d 198 (1935).
39. See Note, Reforming the Vendor's Remedies for Breach of Installment Land
Sale Contracts, 47 S . CAL.L. REV.191, 205 (1973).
40. 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949).
41. CAL.CN. CODE$ 3275 (West 1970).
42. 5 Cal. 3d 809, 488 P.2d 1353, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1971).
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dated damages contained in sections 1670-1671,and the provision
of section 3369 that "neither specific nor preventive relief can be
granted to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in any case . . ." prevented a forfeiture having no reasonable relation to the damage
caused by the vendee's breach even when that breach is willful.
Although the court noted that "persuasive arguments" had been
made by Professor John Hetland that installment land contracts
should be treated like mortgages and deeds of trust and that
willfully defaulting debtors should therefore have the right to
redeem, it concluded that because the vendee was entitled to
specific performance, "we need not decide whether she might also
be entitled to some other remedy under the law governing security transaction^."^^
From the viewpoint of vendors, the trend illustrated above
toward recognition of an equity of redemption is rather frightening. In the absence of statute, nothing but a court order can cut
off an equity of redemption. In effect, this means that the vendor
can be forced to litigate-precisely the thing he hoped to avoid
by use of the installment contract. Even if the court will follow
the example of the Supreme Court of Kansas, granting forfeiture
in the event the purchaser is unable to redeem,44the vendor's
situation is far less advantageous than he expected when the
contract was signed.
3. Restitution

In a jurisdiction in which no equity of redemption is yet
recognized, or in a case in which the purchaser cannot or will not
redeem, traditional analysis would suggest that forfeiture should
follow. But along this dimension, too, the courts have been actively reforming the law. Increasingly they are holding that forfeiture may not be "free" and that the vendor must return the
payments he has received insofar as they exceed his actual damages. Some courts, such as those of Utah, take this position only
in cases in which they conclude that an outright forfeiture would
be "unconscionable,"45 but this may simply mean that the purchaser would suffer a substantial net loss if no restitution were
ordered .46
43. Id. at 816, 488 P.2d at 1357, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 541. See also Williams Plumbing
Co. v. Sinsley, 53 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 126 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1975) (where breach not intentional).
44. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
45. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954).
46. The Utah court has had difficulty in reaching a consensus as to what is
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The Utah cases usually measure the vendor's damages as the
fair rental value of the property during the period of the purchaser's occupancy, plus such incidental damages as repairs and
a sales commission upon resale.47In most of the fact situations
presented, courts have concluded that these items exceed the
purchaser's payments and that he is not entitled to restitution.
For example, in Strand u. M ~ y n ethe
, ~ vendees
~
under an installment land contract for the sale of a motel had made payments of
principal and interest of over $19,000 on a $41,500 purchase price.
They also spent $9,500 on repairs on the premises. Upon default,
the vendors obtained possession by an unlawful detainer action.
The vendees subsequently brought an action to recover the payments made under the contract on the ground that retention by
the vendor was unconscionable. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment for the vendor, noting that the fair
rental value of the motel up to the date of forefeiture, when added
to the down payment the vendees had received on a resale of the
property to a third party, exceeded the total of their payments to
the vendors. The court observed that "[tlhis clearly shows that
the amount they have lost under the forfeiture provision is not
unconscionable . . . ."" Similarly, in Weyher u. Petersonm the
Utah court concluded, in affirming a judgment for a vendor under
a forcible entry and detainer action based on a forfeiture clause,
that the rental value and damages, totalling $10,505, exceeded
the $9,387 the vendee had paid on the contract and found no
inequity in refusing to allow the vendee to recover some of his
payments.
Although vendees have generally not fared well in Utah litig a t i ~ n ,the
~ ' reasoning of the above decisions indicates that complete vendor reliance on the forfeiture clause is probably misplaced. In the above cases, the court upheld forfeiture because it
believed the vendor's actual damages, based on the property's
fair rental value, exceeded the vendee's payments. In the few
Utah cases in which the vendee's payments exceeded the vendor's
"unconscionable."See Kay v. Wood, 549 P.2d 709 (Utah 1976).
47. See, e.g., Weyher v. Peterson, 16 Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965).
48. 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963).
49. Id. at 357, 384 P.2d at 398.
50. 16 Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965).
51. One factor contributing to this litigation record is that few Utah vendees appear
to record their contracts. Those who do record and subsequently default can probably
settle with their vendors for at least the nuisance value of the suit which would be necessary to clear the vendor's title, since the damages and restitution issues are always litigable.
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damages, the court did order restitution to the vendee of the
excess.52
Florida cases also appear to impose a burden of showing
unconscionability upon a purchaser who prays for restitution.
Unfortunately, Florida courts have been less than carefully analytic in articulating the relevant test and thus have made the
availability of restitution quite unpredictable. In Chace u.
Johnson,53for example, the vendee was one year in default and
sued to recover money totalling 80% of the contract price. The
Florida Supreme Court ordered the vendor to return payments to
the vendee that exceeded the vendor's damages. On the other
hand, in Sawyer u. Marco Island Development C ~ r p .where
,~~ a
vendor brought suit to remove from the record the interests of
several vendees, one of whom was one year in default and who had
paid 90% of the purchase price, a Florida appellate court held
that vendee's interest could be extinguished without return of the
payments made. Title to thirty-six lots was involved in Sawyer.
Other vendees were also involved but were represented by a
guardian ad litem because they did not appear. None of the vendees so represented had paid over 25% of the purchase price. The
vendee who had paid the 90%, however, was personally represented. Despite the special circumstance of this last vendee, the
court enforced forfeiture as to everyone, observing:
We see a substantial difference between the unjust enrichment
which would result if a large deposit were forfeited within a short
period of time and a situation where a vendor has removed his
property from the market for several years while the vendee
abandons the contract by ceasing to make further payments

. . . .55

The purchaser's restitution remedy is perhaps best developed in California. It should be noted first that, under the rule
of Venable u. Harmon,56a vendor cannot receive a deficiency
judgment regardless of his loss. Beyond this, California antiforfeiture cases also compel the vendor to return to the vendee any
amount paid in excess of the vendor's damages. In Freedman u.
Rector, Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Matthias Parish, 57 for ex52. Kay v. Wood, 549 P.2d 709 (Utah 1976); Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278
P.2d 294 (1954).
53. 98 Fla. 118, 123 So. 519 (1929).
54. 301 So. 2d 820 (Fla. App. 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 757 (1975).
55. 301 So. 2d at 821.
56. 233 Cal. App. 2d 297, 43 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1965) (based on CAL.CIV.PROC.CODE§
580b (West 1970)).
57. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
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ample, the California Supreme Court held that it violated the
public policies against forfeitures, penalties, and unjust enrichment to deny restitution, even to a vendee willfully in default.
There have been problems, however, in determining the amount
of restitution to which the vendee is entitled. Under the reasoning
of the California Supreme Court decision in Honey v. Henry's
Franchise Leasing Gorp.," the vendor apparently has the option
of measuring his damages by either the "rental value" (giving
restitution of the amount by which the vendee's payments exceed
the fair rental value of the property while the vendee was in
possession) or the "difference value" (giving restitution of the
amount by which the vendee's payments exceed the difference
between the current market value and the higher original contract price)." Professor Hetland points out that "rarely over the
past few decades has the value of the property dropped so that
the vendor prefers difference value to his alternative measure-rental value?O The choice is the vendor's, according to
Honey, because permitting the vendee to make it would in effect
give all installment vendees an option to convert their contracts
into leases-an advantage the court hardly thought appropriate
to give to a defaulter.
I t is interesting to note that the economic results of the
"difference value" measure of restitution are roughly similar to
those of a judicial sale, in the sense that the market value of the
property is debited against the vendor's claim. Of course, the two
approaches are distinct, since in a restitution case the property's
value is measured by the court upon the testimony of witnesses,
rather than by a sale?
58. 64 Cal. 2d 801,415 P.2d 833,52 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1966).
59. The court noted that since recission was not sought by the vendor, the rental
value standard was inappropriate; the court consequently held that the proper calculation
involved the difference value.
60. J. HETLAND,
SECURED
REAL ESTATE
TRANSA~IONS
52 (1974).
61. If the California Supreme Court's formulation of the "difference value" measure
of restitution is taken literally, then it seems subject to serious criticism. The problem is
illustrated by the following example.
Assume P buys property from V under an installment contract. The pertinent facts
of the transaction are:
Purchase price
Down payment
Original debt
Monthly payments

= $30,000

=
-

=

2,000
28,000, 8% interest, 25-year maturity
216.11

Suppose default occurs after five years and that the value of the property has declined,
so that:
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Value of property
Balance on debt

= $25,000

=

25,836.58 (based on standard mortgage
payment tables)

If foreclosure by judicial sale occurs, and if the costs of foreclosure are neglected and the
sale brings fair market value, the sale proceeds will be $25,000; V will be entitled to a
deficiency judgment of $836.58, assuming no antideficiency statute. (In California, no
such judgment will be permitted if a one-to-four-family house is involved. CAL.CIV.PRoc.
CODEEj 580b (West 1970).)
Suppose that V, instead of seeking foreclosure, elects to terminate P's rights under
the contract and to make restitution, as he is permitted to do under Honey. V must restore
to P all payments made in excess of V's loss. V elects the "difference value" measure of
loss.

(-1

Payments made

= $14,966.60 ($215.11 p e r mo. x 60 months)

V's loss
Restitution

-

including $2,000 down payment
5,000.00 ($30,000 minus $25,000)
9,966.60

Thus, instead of being entitled to a deficiency judgment, V must pay back to P nearly
$10,000. This is, to say the least, a strange result.
The problem is that the court, in computing the amount of restitution, has ignored
the "time value" of money. In a short-term marketing contract for $30,000, if P breaches
and V must remarket the property one month later for $25,000, it is reasonably accurate
to say that V's damages are $5,000. See Jensen v. Dalton, 9 Cal. App. 3d 654,88 Cal. Rptr.
426 (1970). If, however, the period between contract and breach is five years (during which
V has not had possession), the $5,000 damage figure is completely erroneous. Let us
recompute V's damages, but in doing so translate all amounts involved to a single point
in time by computing future values for each amount involved, using compound interest
tables. We may select any point in time we wish, but a convenient reference point is the
fifth annivei-sary of the sale-which happens to be the date of default. (This is convenient
because nothing of financial significance happens thereafter, and whatever V's damages
are on that date can easily be translated to their value on the date of judgment simply by
adding interest.)
In order to make translations of values to any given date, we must assume some
interest or discount rate. Let us use 896, since it is the figure selected by the parties
themselves when they initiated the transaction. Here is what actually happened:

Date
1-1-0

V gives u p $30,000 asset, receives $2,000 cash.
F u t u r e value of $28,000, as of 1-1-5

= $41,715.66 (+)

2-1-0
through
1-1-5

V receives regular monthly payments of
$216.11. F u t u r e value of $216.1 1/mo. f o r
6 0 months

= $15,879.08

(-)

1-1-5

V receives back t h e property, worth $25,000

=

(-)

S u b t r a c t i n g w h a t V received f r o m w h a t h e gave up,
damages

$25,000.00

= $

836.58

Thus the "difference value" approach to restitution, properly computed, yields results
exactly equal to a foreclosure sale. Of course, under California law, V cannot actually
recover the $836.58 deficiency. Venable v. Harmon, 233 Cal. App. 2d 297, 43 Cal. Rptr.
490 (1965).
No California case appears clearly to recognize the foregoing problem. Perhaps the
closest is Kudokas v. Balkus, 26 Cal. App. 3d 744, 103 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972), a "difference
value" case in which the court refused to allow the vendees to claim, as part of their
"payments," the interest they had paid prior to default on deeds of trust they had as-
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4. Foreclosure as a mortgage

The trend of the cases discussed above is clearly toward application of mortgage concepts to aid defaulting purchasers. The
logical conclusion of this trend would be an absolute equivalency
of installment contracts and mortgages, with foreclosure becoming the exclusive means by which a vendor could realize upon his
security interest in the property. For a court to take this position
should hardly seem surprising, for the judiciary reached the same
conclusion long ago with regard to other forms of mortgage substitutes. Nevertheless, our research has disclosed only two states,
California and Indiana, whose courts have indicated an acceptance of this view without legislative intervention.
California cases actually include no direct holding that foreclosure is a proper remedy in an installment contract default.
However, a California Supreme Court decision, Honey v. Henry's
Franchise Leasing C ~ r p .and
,~~
an opinion by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Ward v. Union Bond & Trust Co.,63 imply that
a judicial sale would be appropriate if at least one of the parties
requests it. To date there appears to be no California appellate
opinion in which either purchaser or vendor has sought a judicial
sale, and thus the language in the cases mentioned must be regarded as dicta. If taken at face value, however, the language
makes California the most protective state from the purchaser's
viewpoint, with an equity of redemption, restitution, and judicial
sale all available to him.
In Indiana the case for judicial sale is both better defined and
less dependent on the wishes of the parties. In Skendzel v.
M a r ~ h a l lthe
, ~ ~vendor sought a judicial declaration of forfeiture
of a vendee's interest where the vendee had already paid $21,000
of a $36,000 contract price. The Indiana Supreme Court applied
the concept that "equity abhors a forfeiture" and held that enforcement of the forfeiture clause was "clearly excessive" and
sumed. Id. at 756; 103 Cal. Rptr. a t 325. Even this holding does not address the problem
systematically.
The "future value" problem is also raised in "rental value" restitution cases, but its
impact is relatively slight if the vendee's payments have been fairly regular prior to default
and if they approximate the rental value of the property.
62. 64 Cal. 2d 801, 415 P.2d 833, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1966).
One other decision by the California Supreme Court suggests the availability of
foreclosure in the installment contract context. See MacFadden v. Walker, 5 Cal. 3d 809,
488 P.2d 1353, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1971).
63. 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957).
64. 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973).
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"unreasonable." More significantly, however, the court treated
the installment land contract as a mortgage:
The Court, in effect, views a conditional land contract as a sale
with a security interest in the form of legal title reserved by the
vendor. Conceptually, therefore, the retention of the title by the
vendor is the same as reserving a lien or mortgage. Realistically,
vendor-vendee should be viewed as mortgagee-mortgagor. To
conceive of the relationship in different terms is to pay homage
to form over s ~ b s t a n c e . ~ ~

The court ordered that the contract be foreclosed judicially in
accordance with Indiana mortgage procedure. While the court did
not absolutely rule out forfeiture in all cases, it did limit application of forfeiture to cases of absconding or abandoning vendees or
to situations in which a minimum amount has been paid and the
vendee seeks to retain possession while the vendor is making expenditures for taxes, insurance, and maintenance.
Skendzel has been followed in several subsequent decisions
by Indiana appellate courts. For example, in Tidd v. Stauffer,"
a defaulting vendee sought to obtain specific performance by paying the remaining balance where $16,000 out of a $39,000 contract
price had been paid. The Court of Appeals of Indiana noted that
forfeiture was inappropriate and directed the trial court to order
judicial foreclosure of the contract in the event that the vendees
failed promptly to pay the balance of the contract price. In Fisel
v. Yoder," a vendee in default who had paid one-fourth of the
purchase price was allowed to continue to make payments on the
contract; the vendor's request for forfeiture was denied. On the
other hand, in Dolurldson v. Sellmer," the Court of Appeals of
Indiana affirmed a trial court's award of forfeiture to a vendor
where the vendee had paid $7,000 out of a $23,158 purchase price.
There the appellate court agreed that the case fell within an
exception to Skendzel in that the vendee "had wholly failed to
perform his obligation to acquire adequate insurance and had
allowed the property to deteriorate to such an extent that substantial repair was necessary before the house would even be
habitable?
--

65. Id. at 234, 301 N.E.2d at 646.
66. 308 N.E.2d 415 (Ind. App. 1974).
67. 320 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. App. 1975).
68. 333 N.E.2d 862 (Ind. App. 1975).
69. Id. at 866. In Goff v. Grahab, 306 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. App. 1974), forfeiture of an
installment land contract was upheld because of evidence showing that the vendee had
failed to insure as required by the contract, had committed waste, and had deliberately
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Thus in Indiana, in most instances where the defaulting
vendee has a substantial equity, installment land contracts are
now treated as mortgages. Because of the exceptions noted above,
Skendzel does not go as far judicially as Oklahoma went legislatively in converting installment land contracts into mortgages.
Nonetheless, the case constitutes the clearest judicial statement
to date of that principle.70
There is every reason to expect this movement to continue,
particularly in states in which there is little or no statutory regulation of land contracts. The same factors that induced the courts
to treat other mortgage substitutes as mortgages-particularly
the necessitous borrower's willingness to sign anything presented
to him and the potential for a harsh and unwarranted loss of his
investment as a consequence of his default-should and will almost surely be increasingly persuasive in the installment contract
context.
It is sometimes argued that this trend is undesirable and that
it is socially advantageous for the law to provide an extremely
quick and cheap method for a vendor to terminate his purchaser's
interest in the real estate upon default. Such a procedure, it is
said, encourages the extension of credit to individuals whose
creditworthiness is so poor that they would otherwise be unable
to transact at all. There are, however, two errors in this argument.
First, the cases discussed above illustrate that no vendor today
can count on forfeiture under a land contract as being either
quick or cheap; indeed, it is an invitation to litigation. Second,
no procedure, however quick or cheap, can be justified if it
amounts to foul play. The solution, of course, is not for the law
to ignore the legitimate needs of installment contract purchasers,
but to reform the modes of foreclosure commonly used for mortgages to make them as inexpensive and rapid as feasible, consistent with the requirements of fairness and due process. If this is
done, land contracts (if they continue to exist a t all) can be
brought within the ambit of the more efficient mortgage foreclosure proceedings, and no one will have cause for complaint. Perhaps the growing tendency of the courts to treat land contracts
as mortgages will bring pressure on state legislatures to accomneglected the property. The vendee had paid a down payment of $1,950 and one monthly
payment of $562.62 on a contract price of $61,750 amortized over 20 years.
70. For analysis of the Indiana situation, see Bepko, Contracts and Commercial Law,
8 IND.L. REV.116, 117-20 (1974); Polston, Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana
Law-Property, 10 IND.L. REV.297, 298 n.4 (1976); Strausbaugh, Exorcising the Forfeiture Clause From Real Estate Conditional Sales Contracts, 4 REAL EST.L.J. 71 (1975).
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plish the needed reforms of mortgage law.
In light of the judicial trend outlined above, we must ask why
installment land contracts continue to be used. The question is
particularly perplexing in those states in which relatively rapid
nonjudicial foreclosure is available for mortgages or deeds of
trust. The reason given several years ago by Professor William
Warren may still be applicable: "[Tlhe vendor continues to use
the instalment sale contract despite its deficiencies with regard
to remedies because he is willing to gamble that the vendee's
rights under this device will never be asserted and his own contractual advantages will not be ~hallenged."~'In addition, it is
possible that neither most vendors nor most real estate brokers
have an accurate concept of the risks of litigation that land contracts present today. Whatever the motivations of vendors, it is
clear that the risks are inflating rapidly.
5. Constitutionality of forfeiture

In recent years power of sale mortgage and deed of trust
foreclosure procedures have been under increasing attack as violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.72
The constitutional questions presented by these attacks may be
raised as well in the context of installment contracts. Space does
not permit a detailed discussion of these cases here, but in essence they have focused on two aspects of the foreclosure process:
notice and hearing. Many power of sale statutes do not provide
for any notice, or only notice by publication or posting, to the
debtor and to junior lienors." In addition, the statutes usually
make no provision a t all for a hearing, either before or after the
foreclosure. If the due process clause is applicable to the foreclosure process, it is very clear that many statutes violate the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Mullane u. Central
71. Warren, California Instalment Land Sales Contracts: A Time for Reform, 9
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 608, 633 (1962).
72. See Leen, Galbraith, & Gant, Due Process and Deeds of Trust-Strange
Bedfellows?, 48 WASH. L. REV. 763 (1973); Nelson, Deed of 7'rust Foreclosure Under
Powers of Sale-Constitutional Problems-Legislative Alternatives, 28 J . Mo. B. 428
(1972);Pedowitz, Current Developments in Summary Foreclosure, 9 REAL PROP.PRoB. &
TRUST
J . 421, 425-31 (1974);Comment, The Constitutionality of the California Trustee's
Sale, 61 CALIF.L. REV.1282 (1973);Comment, Due Process Problems of Mississippi Power
of Sale Foreclosure, 47 MISS.L.J. 67 (1976);Comment, Notice Requirements of the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sale, 51 N.C.L. REV. 1110 (1973);Comment, Power of Sale Foreclosure After Fuentes, 40 U . CHI.L. RBV. 206, 217-20 (1972).
73. See, e.g., D.C. CODE$45-615 (1973);MISS.CODEANN.!j 89-1-55 (1972).Cf. M I N N .
STAT.ANN. $ 580.03 (West 1947) (personal service on person in possession only).
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Hanover Bank & Trust C O . ,since
~ ~ the notice they provide is "not
reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed
by other means at hand."75 The hearing standard is not quite so
clear, but there is a strong probability that on the merits the total
absence of a presale hearing would also be held unconstitutional. 76
The application of these due process standards to installment contract forfeitures is somewhat uncertain, and no cases
seem to have been reported. But some observations may nevertheless be safely made. Many contract forms do provide for direct
mail notice to the purchaser as a prerequisite to forfeiture, and
this would certainly meet the Mullane standard.77However, as in
the case of mortgages, a contract procedure that provided only
publication notice or the like would not. Installment contracts
almost never provide for a hearing, and on this point they are as
suspect as power of sale mortgages.
Whether it will ever be necessary for the contract forfeiture
process to withstand scrutiny on the merits of the due process
clause is questionable, however. Two defenses raised, often successfully, by power of sale mortgages appear to be similarly applicable to the contract situation. The first is waiver. If the contract itself contains language by which the purchaser authorizes
a forfeiture by the vendor without notice or hearing, can the purchase later be heard to complain that his constitutional rights
were violated? In related contexts, the Supreme Court has held
that the efficacy of such a contractual waiver depends on a variety of factors, including the specificity of the waiver, the relative
equality of bargaining power of the parties, the sophistication of
the waiving party, and perhaps whether the waiver was part of a
74. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
75. Id. at 319. This conclusion has been reached in three mortgage foreclosure cases.
See Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976); Turner v. Blackburn, 389
F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975);Law v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
76. See United States v. White, 429 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Ricker v.
United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250
(W.D.N.C. 1975); Gamer v. Tri-State Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974);
Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974), reu'd on
other grounds, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975). Contra, Guidarelli v. Lazaretti, 233 N.W.2d
890 (Minn. 1975).
77. Junior liens may, of course, be created by contract vendees. For example, a
vendee may mortgage his contract interest. If such an interest exists and is recorded or
otherwise readily identifiable by the vendor, failure of the vendor to provide notice to the
junior lienor may raise the same due process issues as in the analogous first mortgage
foreclosure situation. But see Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456, 463-64, 452 P.2d 222,
227-28 (1969) (holding, without discussion of constitutional principles, that the vendee's
junior mortgagee was cut off by the vendor's forfeiture notwithstanding lack of notice).
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printed contract.78Obviously each case must be litigated upon its
facts, but in the typical installment contract transaction the
waiver is probably not very explicit, is part of the printed form,
and is generally not a point of negotiation; the purchaser will
often be able to make a t least a colorable argument that the
purported waiver does not bind him.
The second defense that power of sale mortgagees have asserted in constitutional litigation is that no state action is involved in such foreclosures. State action is, of course, a prerequisite to applicability of the fourteenth amendment; if nonjudicial
foreclosure is deemed a purely private process, no due process
standard need be met. The plaintiffs in these cases have sought
to show the presence of state action, pointing out that in most
states in which power of sale foreclosure is widely employed, it is
authorized and regulated by statute. A few early cases found state
action to be present,79but the clear trend of recent decisions is
against such a finding.80There is no Supreme Court decision yet
on the point, but the probabilities are that state action will be
found absent in the typical power of sale mortgage foreclosure.
Superficially, this conclusion seems equally valid with regard
to installment contract forfeitures. By the terms of the typical
contract, no judicial action is necessary to effect a forfeiture, and
no state official is involved except perhaps the recorder of deeds,
whose duties are entirely mechanical. However, both the Iowastyle recording-of-forfeiture statutes and the recent cases discussed above permitting redemption, restitution, or judicial sale
78. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972);
D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). Mortgage foreclosure cases rejecting
the mortgagee's waiver argument include Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D.
Me. 1976); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Gamer v. Tri-State
Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Law v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 1233
(N.D. Ga. 1973). Cf. Huggins v. DeMent, 13 N.C. App. 673, 187 S.E.2d 412 (provision in
deed for foreclosure upon default found to constitute sufficient notice for due process
requirements), appeal dismissed, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 898, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1071
(1972); 51 N.C.L. REV.1110 (1973).
79. See Turner v. Blackbum, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Northrip v. Federal
Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974). Turner relies heavily upon the
rather peculiar participation of the clerk of the court in nonjudicial foreclosures under the
then-applicable North Carolina statute.
80. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975); Barrera
v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975); Bryant v. Jefferson Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Y Aleman Corp. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 414 F. Supp. 93 (D. Guam 1975); Kenly v. Miracle Properties, 412 F. Supp. 1072
(D. Ariz. 1976); Lawson v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Global Indus., Inc.
v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Howlett,
521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1026 (1975).
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at the behest of the purchaser may actually strengthen the state
action argument. If the state, through its court system, actively
superintends forfeiture procedures generally, its involvement is
arguably sufficient to trigger the protections of the fourteenth
amendment.81The fact that the contract itself says nothing about
such state involvement is probably irrelevant. It may seem ironic
that the state, by providing certain minimal protections, becomes
constitutionally obligated to provide greater ones, but that peculiarity is actually built into the fourteenth amendment state action concept. In any event, these constitutional theories must be
taken seriously; plainly, their existence further increases the litigation risk of the vendor who elects to secure his debt with an
installment contract.
Even if the courts ultimately conclude that land contract
forfeitures generally involve no state action, the current posture
of constitutional litigation may well have a direct bearing on the
future of the installment contract. This is true because in many
of these cases the creditor is a government agency, so that the
presence of governmental action is incontestibly clear.82In all
such cases to date, the security instrument in question has been
a mortgage or a deed of trust; government agencies rarely sell
land on installment contracts. Nonetheless, the holdings of unconstitutionality of power of sale foreclosure procedures that the
courts are writing in these government agency cases will put increasing pressure on state legislatures to revise their power of sale
statutes, bringing them into compliance with constitutional standards of notice and hearing. In some cases these legislative revisions may be so extensive as to sweep in the installment contract,
placing it on an equal footing with the mortgage or deed of trust
for foreclosure purposes. Even where this does not occur, the existence of a revised, constitutionally approved foreclosure procedure may be sufficiently attractive to vendors that they will adopt
documents which employ that procedure, rather than continuing
to assume the litigation risks inherent in the installment contract.
81. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich.
1974), rev'd, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975), in which the district court held the Michigan
power of sale foreclosure procedure to be state action on the ground that the statute
encouraged mortgagees to opt for nonjudicial foreclosure. The argument is not, however,
a powerful one, and was rejected by the Sixth Circuit. Cf. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972) (finding an extensive scheme of state regulation of liquor licenses insufficient
to implicate state action in the racial discrimination practices by a private club).
82. See, e.g., United States v. White, 429 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
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III. TITLEPROBLEMS
UNDER
INSTALLMENT
CONTRACTS
A. Problems for Vendees
When a person purchases property as a vendee under an
installment land contract, the chances of title problems with respect to the vendee's interest are greater than if the transaction
were cast in the purchase money mortgage setting. This is true,
to a large extent, even in those jurisdictions that have reduced the
impact of the forefeiture provision by statute or judicial decision.
In the usual purchase money mortgage situation, the chances
are extremely high that the purchaser will examine the seller's
title and require it to be marketable. Even if the purchaser is not
sophisticated enough to have the title checked, any third party
lender involved in the transaction will insist upon a title insurance policy or a t least upon an attorney's title opinion as evidence
that the seller's title is good. On the other hand, in installment
land contract situations there is a strong possibility that the vendor's title will not be examined a t the time the contract is executed. Here there usually is no third party lender to insist upon
title examination-the vendor serves that economic function, and
he is unlikely to insist upon an examination of his own title.
Moreover, many contract purchasers have low incomes and either
cannot afford a title examination or do not recognize the need for
it. Accordingly, many purchasers may unknowingly execute a
contract, go into possession, and make substantial installment
payments when in fact the vendor's title is encumbered by mortgages, judgment liens, or other interests perfected prior to the
execution of the contract.83
The recording act can also cause substantial problems for an
installment land contract vendee. In the usual purchase money
mortgage transaction, the deed to the mortgagor and the mortgage or deed of trust will be recorded almost immediately. If there
is no third party lender, the purchaser will record his deed as a
matter of custom. Any third party lender involved will insist upon
and carry out immediate recordation in order to protect itself
against subsequent interests and encumbrances that may be created by or rise against the mortgagor. This recording by the mortgagee will also protect the mortgagor against any subsequent interests arising through the former owner of the land. On the other
83. See generally Mixon, Installpent Land Contracts: A Study of Low Income Transactions, with Proposals for Reform and a New Program to Provide Home Ownership in
the Inner City, 7 HOUSTON
L. REV. 523, 545-46 (1970).
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hand, in the installment land contract situation there is no third
party stimulus for prompt recording. Many unsophisticated
vendees do not record and, as we shall see later, actually may be
prevented from recording by acts of the vendor.84Since vendors
anticipate a high default rate among vendees, it is in the vendors'
interest that the contracts not be recorded so that they may
quickly resell to other purchasers without the necessity of a judicial proceeding to remove a title cloud posed by a recorded contract? Suppose, for instance, that after executing the contract,
a vendor either mortgages the land or sells it to another purchaser. While it is true in many jurisdictions that possession by
the original vendee will constitute constructive notice to those
dealing with the land thereafter and thus will be the equivalent
of r e ~ o r d i n gthis
, ~ ~ is not universally the case. Even if possession
does constitute constructive notice, establishing the existence of
that possession could require litigation, while the fact of a recorded document would
Even if the vendee does receive assurance prior to the execution of the contract that the vendor has good title, and even if the
vendee records promptly, the installment land contract transaction could pose additional problems for the vendee that would not
be present in a purchase money mortgage transaction. Suppose,
for example, that four years into a ten-year installment contract,
the vendor goes into bankruptcy. Section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy
Act provides that "[tlhe trustee shall assume or reject an executory c ~ n t r a c t . " ~ ~ e c a uofs the
e rule of In re New York Investors
Mutual Group, Inc.,8g this statutory provision presents serious
-

84. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
85. See Mixon, supra note 83, a t 547.
86. See, e.g., Drey v. Doyle, 99 Mo. 459, 12 S.W. 287 (1889); Comment, Possession
as Notice Under Missouri Recording Act, 16 Mo. L. REV.142 (1951).
87. Failure to record an installment land contract may also cause problems for the
vendee when the vendor goes into bankruptcy. This is because section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act authorizes a bankruptcy trustee in his status as a hypothetical lien creditor to
take advantage of state recording statutes to defeat an unrecorded interest. If, under state
law, such a contract is recordable (and they generally are) and an unrecorded interest is
invalid against creditors who obtain a judgment lien without notice of the unrecorded
interest, a bankruptcy trustee may be able under section 70(c) to avoid the contract. In
re Sayre Village Manor, 120 F. Supp. 215 (D.N.J. 1954); Lacy, Land Sale Contracts in
Bankruptcy, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 477, 493-97 (1973); Lynn, Bankruptcy and the Land
Sales Contract: The Rights of the Vendee Vis-A-Vis the Vendor's Bankruptcy Trustee, 5
TEX.TECH.L. REV.677, 694-99 (1974). Normally, however, possession will be the equivalent of recording. See Lacy, supra at 496. In some states where possession is not constructive notice, however, a nonrecording vendee in possession may be vulnerable under section
7O(c). See note 86 supra.
88. 11 U.S.C. $ 110(b) (1970).
89. 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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problems for a vendee. In that case, a land contract vendee contended that he was entitled to specific performance against the
bankruptcy trustee who had disaffirmed the contract under the
above statute. The vendee contended that disaffirmance divested
it of its equitable title to the land. The court, however, concluded
that any rights of the vendee originated solely in the contract and
that section 70(b) apparently did not exclude contracts for the
sale of real estate from the trustee's power to reject executory
contracts. Professor Warren has commented that application of
the New York Investors rule would leave an installment land
contract vendee "with a claim for damages instead of a home."g0
Despite this criticism, subsequent decisions have followed the
New York Investors case." Professor Frank R. Lacy, however, has
pointed out that the contracts in all these later cases may have
been executory or earnest money contracts rather than true installment land contracts. He contends that true installment land
contracts are the functional equivalent of purchase money mortgages: "[the vendee] has made his payments in reliance on a
particular asset belonging to the vendor, and this, taken with his
right of possession and the substantial protection against loss of
his rights even though he may default, justifies full preservation
of his right to the property in the vendor's b a n k r ~ p t c y . "Such
~~
equities do not exist in the "truly executory" contract contemplating conveyance, payment of the full price, and a closing date
in the near future. I t remains possible, however, that absent
amendment of section 70(b), the principle of New York Investors
will be applied to installment land contract^.^^
While vendor bankruptcy presents risks to a land contract
vendee, the existence of federal tax liens against the vendor is no
longer a problem for the prudent vendee who has title examined
prior to contract execution and who has actually recorded the
90. Warren, supra note 71, at 613.
91. See Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1963);In re Philadelphia Penn Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661 (3rd Cir. 1960).
92. Lacy, supra note 87, at 483-84 (footnote omitted).
93. Id. at 481.
The proposed revisions of the Bankruptcy Act, which failed to pass in 1977, would
solve this problem. If the trustee in bankruptcy rejects the contract, the purchaser in
possession may elect to terminate the contract or to remain in possession. If he remains
in possession, he must continue to make payments, but may offset against these payments
any damages incurred because of rejection. The trustee in bankruptcy must deliver title
to the purchaser in accordance with the provisions of the contract, but is relieved of all
other obligations. H.R.8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see H.R.REP NO. 95-595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 347-50 (1977).
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contract. If the vendor is delinquent in payment of federal taxes,
the United States may obtain a lien on "all property and rights
to property, whether real or personal, belonging to [the delin~ ~ lien is ineffective against "any purquent t a ~ p a y e r ] . "This
chaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgin a
ment lien creditor until notice thereof . . . has been filedyYg5
designated place. Thus, for example, if a grantee recorded a conveyance of the taxpayer-grantor's property for adequate and full
consideration prior to the filing of a tax lien and without actual
knowledge of the lien, the grantee's title would not be encumbered by the lien. A fortiori, if the lien arose after the conveyance,
the grantee is protected. Before the 1966 amendments to the Federal Tax Lien Act, however, there was case law indicating that a
vendee who had taken possession under an installment land contract, but who had not received legal title, did not come within
the statutory definition of a "purchaser" and thus was subject not
only to preexisting unfiled tax liens, but also to liens for taxes
arising against the vendor after the contract was executed and the
vendee went into possession." Now, however, that problem has
been largely obviated by the rule which provides that a person
who enters into a written executory contract to purchase property
is afforded the protection of a "purchaser" with title.g7Thus, in
most situations the contract vendee who takes possession pursuant to an installment land contract is protected against unfiled
tax liens arising against the vendor before the execution of the
contract and against all such liens arising thereafter.
There is still, however, a potential pitfall for some vendees.
Under the Federal Tax Lien Act, protection of the contract
vendee as a "purchaser" is "conditioned upon his having taken
whatever action is necessary under local law to protect his interest against subsequent purchasers without actual notice."98 In
most states the contract vendee's possession qualifies as constructive notice against such subsequent purchasers. However, in
those states where possession does not so qualify,ggrecording is
necessary. Thus, in view of the fact that many vendees do not
record, it is conceivable that a vendee, after properly examining
94. I.R.C. 5 6321.
95. I.R.C. 5 6323(a).
96. See United States v. Creamer Indus., Inc., 349 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1965); Leipert
v. R.C. Williams & Co., 161 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
97. W. PLUMB,
F E D E ~TAX
L LIENS73 (3d ed. 1972).
98. Id. at 73.
99. See note 86 supra.
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title at the time of execution of the contract and promptly going
into possession, may nevertheless be vulnerable to tax liens arising after the execution of the installment land contract.

B. Problems for Vendors
As was pointed out earlier, there have been relatively few
title problems for the vendor in those states that specifically regulate forfeiture by statutory procedure. In those states, of which
Iowa and Minnesota are typical, the statutory procedure for termination has been institutionalized, and the statutes provide a
mechanism for establishing record title in the vendor even if the
vendee has recorded the contract. However, in states without
such statutory mechanisms, and where the forfeiture clause is
governed solely or largely by case law, there are potential title
problems for the vendor. Indeed, in many such jurisdictions, the
installment land contract "will provide the . . . vendor with an
efficientand cheap method of regaining possession of the contract
land and a merchantable title only if the vendee fails completely
to assert his rights."loOAs one commentator has noted:
Thus, if, after default, the vendee moves out of possession, without protest and without having recorded the contract, the vendor will be able to resell the land to a person who will probably
qualify as a bona fide purchaser. In practice this probably often
happens and may explain, in part, why the installment land
contract is continually used. The thing to remember, however,
is that any device is practical if the other party does nothing to
protect his rights.lO'

On the other hand, suppose the vendee attempts to protect
his rights by recording his contract and thereafter goes into default. Even assuming that a court will find that enforcing forfeiture would be valid under the circumstances, it will take a judicial proceeding to make that determination. A statement or affidavit that forfeiture has occurred, recorded by the vendor, will
probably not suffice.
Thus, the vendor is faced with the costly prospect of a quiet title
action or some other judicial proceeding to regain a marketable
title. The vendee, for settlement purposes, may very well be able
to demand much more than what he has invested in the property as the price for a quit-claim deed.lo2
- -

-

100. Nelson, supra note 15, at 165 (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 165 (emphasis in original).
102. Id.

-

-

5411

THE INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT

571

Some vendors try to eliminate such problems by attempting
to prevent the recording of the contract. The most common
method used to accomplish this is to omit an acknowledgment of
the parties' execution of the contract. For any vendee represented
by counsel, however, this method is easily circumvented by recording an affidavit in which the vendee refers to the installment
land contract and attaches the contract as an exhibit. Or, as a
variation, the vendee could execute and record an affidavit that
incorporates the essential terms of the contract, including the
legal description, the parties, and the important terms. Occasionally, a vendor will attempt to prevent recording by keeping all
copies of the contract. Again, however, it would seem that the
vendee could use the second affidavit method described above.
After all, if in fact a land contract exists, it would surely not be
improper for a vendee to summarize the terms of that contract
in an affidavit. In jurisdictions that do not permit recordation of
affidavits, another variant would be to record an acknowledged
assignment of the purchaser's interest to a straw party and a
reassignment back to the vendee.lo3
Vendors also occasionally attempt to discourage recording by
the vendee by including a provision in the installment land contract that makes recording of the contract a ground for default
and forfeiture. Such provisions may have a substantial deterrent
effect because the risk of forfeiture can never be taken lightly.
Nevertheless, such provisions probably violate the public policy
of encouraging the recording of interests in real estate. Indeed,
Professor Warren has indicated that it is doubtful that such
clauses would be effective "to attain anything more than the
hostility of the judge who has to interpret the contract."lo4
Stated simply, in states where the above title complications
to the vendor can occur, the installment land contract can be a
"pro-vendee" financing device. Where, for example, such contracts are used in a wholesale fashion as substitute financing
devices in low income, low down payment situations, mass recording of such contracts by vendees could increase the vendees'
practical economic interests in the involved real estate and possibly result in pervasive title clouds on substantial amounts of that
103. Id. at 165-66. As we shall see, a vendee's interest is mortgagable. See text accompanying note 108 infra. Thus, even if a vendee does not record, a recorded mortgage from
the vendee will similarly cloud the title. It is unlikely that recording by the vendee under
these circumstances will constitute slander on the vendor's title. See Nelson, supra note
15, at 166.
104. Warren, supra note 71, at 629.
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real estate.
The foregoing, of course, is not intended to deemphasize the
risks for the vendee under installment land contracts. Many of
these risks have been discussed previously. Where the vendee has
paid a substantial amount of the contract and then defaults, the
vendor may choose to go to court to seek enforcement of a forfeiture clause. Notwithstanding clouds on the vendor's title, what
if the court determines that forfeiture is reasonable? In that event
a vendee could lose his entire equity without a public sale. In
addition, some local recorders may occasionally block attempts
by vendees to record evidence of their contracts.lo5In other words,
the installment land contract device means, a t best, uncertainty
for both sides.
I t is perhaps understandable that, notwithstanding the
above risks, installment land contracts would be used in states
where mortgages must be foreclosed by a costly and timeconsuming judicial action. This helps to explain why such contracts are popular in Iowa and Illinois where such a judicial proceeding is the only foreclosure remedy. On the other hand, in
many states, of which Missouri and Utah are typical, where the
power of sale mortgage or deed of trust is permissible and where
foreclosure is efficient and relatively inexpensive, reliance on the
installment land contract is difficult to understand or justify. lo6
Several possible explanations may be suggested. First, the use of
installment land contracts may spill over from states where they
have been used successfully for the good reasons discussed above
to adjacent states where such use is especially dangerous for vendors. Second, many vendors may use land contracts in low down
payment situations and take their chances that the vendees will
be too unsophisticated to record or to otherwise protect their
interests. Finally, many vendors may simply want to feel assured
105. A recorder who strictly adheres to statutory language defining recordable documents could conceivably justify a refusal to record such evidence of a contract. For example, Utah law provides for the recordation of conveyance instruments, but the definition
of "conveyance" arguably eliminates the instrument here in issue:
The term "conveyance" as used in this title shall be construed to embrace
every instrument in writing by which any real estate, or interest in real estate,
is created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except wills, and leases
for a term not exceeding one year.
UTAHCODEANN. $ 57-1-1(1974).
106. While it is true that power of sale foreclosure has been under constitutional
attack on fourteenth amendment due process hearing and notice grounds, those attacks
have been meeting with diminishing success, primarily due to the reluctance of the courts
to find state action in foreclosures by nongovernmental lenders. See notes 72-82 and
accompanying text supra.
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that they will receive their land back in the event of a default by
the vendee. With a mortgage or a deed of trust, of course, the
mortgagee must ultimately foreclose against a defaulting mortgagor; a third party could purchase at the sale, and the mortgagee
thus could be left with money and not the land. Nonetheless, in
view of the uncertainty of the enforceability of the forfeiture
clause in many, if not most, jurisdictions that do not regulate
installment land contracts specifically by statute, reliance on the
forfeiture clause to regain one's land is dubious a t best.lo7

IV. MORTGAGING
THE VENDEE'S
INTEREST:
PROBLEMS
FOR
MORTGAGEES
As a vendee pays off his obligations under an installment
land contract or if, in any event, the land goes up in value, the
vendee's interest can become a significant economic asset. Thus,
it is a relatively common practice for a vendee to seek to borrow
money by using his interest as security for the loan. Functionally,
of course, a mortgage on a vendee's interest is the economic equivalent of a second mortgage, because the vendor holds an interest
analogous to a first purchase money mortgage on the land. Increasingly, the case law recognizes the proposition that the
vendee's interest is mortgagable.lo8
To state this latter proposition, however, raises some serious
questions. For many courts, the determination that the vendee
has an interest which can be mortgaged includes the notion that
mortgages of such interests are valueless unless the mortgagee has
some way to protect his interest against the vendor's declaration
of forfeiture. Thus, a number of cases have held that the vendor
could not declare a forfeiture of an installment land contract
without giving the vendee's mortgagee both notification of intent
to forfeit and an opportunity to protect himself.109Furthermore,
recording by the vendee's mortgagee constitutes, under the reasoning of these cases, constructive notice to the vendor of the
mortgagee's existence and imposes a duty on the vendor to examine the title to the land prior to a declaration of forfeiture in order
to insure that notice can be given to any subsequent mortgagee
of the vendee's interest. One recent decision, however, has held
107. See Nelson, supra note 15, at 167-68.
108. See Davis & Son v. Milligan, 88 Ala. 523,6 So. 908 (1889);Stannard v. Marboe,
159 Minn. 119, 198 N.W. 127 (1924); Fincher v. Miles Homes of Mo., Inc., 549 S.W.2d
848 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969).
109. See, e.g., Stannard v. Marboe, 159 Minn. 119,198 N.W. 127 (1924). See 45 WASH.
L. REV. 645, 646 (1970).
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that, absent actual knowledge of the mortgagee's existence, the
vendor is under no obligation to notify the mortgagee of his intention to declare a forfeiture."O This case relied on the notion that
the recording of an instrument constituted notice only to those
acquiring interest in the land subsequent to a recording and not
to those whose interests predated that recording. The practical
effect of such reasoning will mean that a mortgagee, in order to
protect himself, will be required to give actual notice to the vendor a t the time the mortgagee takes his security interest.
Assuming that notification of an intent to invoke forfeiture
reaches the vendee's mortgagee, how may the latter protect
himself? It has been suggested that notification would permit the
mortgagee to fulfill the obligations of the vendee under the contract."' If this means t h a t the mortgagee may take over the
vendee's interest without foreclosure of the mortgage, it would
seem to be clearly erroneous, since it would confer on a mortgagee
of the vendee greater rights than those possessed by a second
mortgagee in the normal mortgage situation. In the normal situation, the second mortgagee, when the senior mortgage goes into
default, has two options. First, he may pay off or redeem the
senior mortgage and stand in the senior's shoes as an assignee of
that mortgage. At that point, the second mortgagee would own
two mortgages on the land and would have to foreclose one or
both of them in order to acquire either money or title to the land.
Alternatively, the second mortgagee could foreclose his mortgage,
and the purchaser at that sale would buy the land subject to the
first mortgage.l12The foreclosing second mortgagee would get title
only if he were the successful purchaser a t the sale. Otherwise,
the second mortgagee would have his lien paid off. But in no
event can the second mortgagee acquire title to the land without
himself foreclosing.
In applying the mortgage analogy to the installment land
contract situation, it would seem that the vendee's mortgagee
should have no greater rights than a "normal" second mortgagee.
In other words, the vendee's mortgagee should have two options.
First, he could pay off the defaulted land contract and have all
the rights of an assignee of the vendor under that contract. Assuming forfeiture is enforceable in his jurisdiction, the
110. Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969). See also Miles Homes,
Inc. v. Grant, 257 Iowa 697, 134 N.W.2d 569 (1965) (interpreting the Iowa statutory
termination proceeding).
111. 45 WASH.L. REV. 645, 646 (1970).
112. See G. NEBON& D. WHITMAN,
supra note 11, at 242-43.
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mortgagee-assignee presumably could then himself invoke the
forfeiture rights under the contract. But in no event should he be
able to eradicate the vendee's interest without invoking the functional equivalent of foreclosure. Second, the mortgagee could
choose to foreclose his mortgage on the vendee's interest. In that
case the purchaser at the sale would buy the land subject to the
vendor's rights. The mortgagee would either purchase the land
himself or be paid out of the proceeds of the sale. This second
option is, of course, highly risky, because if the vendor is able to
invoke forfeiture promptly, the purchaser at the vendee's mortgagee's foreclosure sale may simply be buying nothing.
Very often, mortgagees of a vendee's interest make the mistake of taking an assignment of the vendee's interest and a quitclaim deed from the vendee as security for the loan to the vendee.
This transaction, of course, will be treated substantively as a
mortgage.l13 The problem is t h a t the use of such documents
means that the mortgagee's second option, foreclosure of his
mortgage, must be accomplished by a costly and time-consuming
judicial action. This is because the assignment and quitclaim
deed will contain no power of sale, so that even if the particular
jurisdiction permits nonjudicial foreclosure, the mortgagee could
not utilize that remedy. Thus, if a mortgage on a vendee's interest
is desired and if the applicable jurisdiction permits nonjudicial
foreclosure, the mortgagee of the vendee should utilize a mortgage
or deed of trust with an express power of sale instead of the
assignment and quitclaim type documents.

Traditionally, the forfeiture remedy available under installment land contracts has involved substantial risks for vendees
and considerable benefits for vendors. In modem practice, however, the risk allocation has changed. To be sure, vendees under
installment contracts may suffer severely when forfeiture occurs.
They may also experience title problems that would not arise
under a purchase money mortgage. But the use of installment
land contracts also involves serious risks for vendors.
Vendors may also have to contend with problems of title. In
some jurisdictions, a defaulting vendee may actually be able t o
demand a greater amount of money to relinquish his interest than
113. See Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969); Cunningham &
Tischler, Disguised Real Estate Security Transactions as Mortgages in Substance, 26
RUTGERS
L. REV.1 (1972).
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he has invested in the property. The alternative for a vendor
seeking to remove a cloud on his title may be a costly quiet title
action. Problems of this nature can be absolutely avoided only
when the vendee completely fails to assert his rights. Given the
increasing availability of legal services to the poor, however, it is
likely that such rights will be asserted with increasing vigor in the
future.
Beyond these problems with title, however, is a more basic
difficulty for vendors. Simply stated, the contractual provision
for forfeiture may be unenforceable in many situations. Given the
various judicial approaches seeking to mitigate the harshness of
forfeiture, the enforcement of the remedy will generally be uncertain a t best. Except in those states that have enacted statutes
approving forfeiture after a specified grace period has elapsed,
vendor reliance on contractual forfeiture provisions is nothing
short of foolish. Even in those states that regulate forfeiture by
statute, however, the risk of a holding of unconstitutionality remains.
In view of the risks involved in land contracts in modern
practice and the trend toward limiting the forfeiture remedy, the
land contract should become an increasingly unattractive vendor
financing option. As the undesirability of the land contract becomes more apparent, the alternative use of the mortgage or deed
of trust should become more appealing to vendors. This will a t
least be true in those states that have statutorily provided for an
expeditious and constitutional method of foreclosure. State legislatures that have not yet enacted statutes approving power of sale
foreclosures that comply with due process standards should do
The enactment of such statutes will encourage a shift away
from installment contracts and toward mortgages and trust
deeds-a shift that will promote the interests of vendors and
vendees while it reduces the risks to both.
114. For examples of recent attempts to create nonjudicial foreclosure procedures
that will be quick, inexpensive, and constitutional, see WASH.REV. CODEANN. $5
61.24.010-.I30 (Supp. 1976), discussed in Leen & Gose, Non-judicial Deed of Trust
Foreclosures, WASH.ST. B. NEWS,JulyIAug. 1975, at 36; UNIFORM
LANDTRANSACTIONS
ACT
§ 3-501(f); S. 2507, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. $9 401-419, 119 CONG.REc. 32,166, 32,175-76
(1973). Each of these attempts greatly expands traditional notice provisions, but none has
hearing requirements extensive enough to meet constitutional demands. An adequate
hearing can, however, be built into a power of sale foreclosure statute without undue
difficulty. See Nelson, Constitutional Problems with Power of Sale Foreclosure: A Judicial
Dilemma, to be published in 43 Mo. L. REV. (1978).

